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In Perspective — 
THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND 
by Roderick F. McDonald 
Foreign cars and other imports have suddenly be-
come considerably more expensive in the United States, 
and Americans abroad find their dollars less valuable. 
These facts, which represent relatively minor misfor-
tunes to most Americans, serve as a reminder that with-
out the self-discipline in monetary matters accepted by 
many nations back in 1944, we might have been suffer-
ing disaster rather than misfortune, and in this period 
there could have been many such disasters. 
Most business people are aware of the existence of 
the International Monetary Fund and are to some extent 
appreciative of the important role it plays in international 
monetary affairs. It may be useful to readers of Tempo 
to review the objectives and activities of the IMF and 
place it in proper perspective as a key institution exert-
ing powerful effects on the fortunes of all of us who live 
in countries belonging to the Fund. 
This review will highlight the things the IMF is intended 
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to do as well as some of the things it is not. It will also 
indicate the philosophy of international monetary policy 
on which the IMF is based. Such a review is timely 
because some of the basic premises on which the Fund 
operates are now being challenged in the light of prob-
lems that have been developing for some time in the 
foreign-exchange markets and have reached the point 
where important decisions are being made. 
Background. As World War II approached its end, the 
world was badly in need of a revitalization of world trade 
and monetary management. The war would leave a leg-
acy of dislocated national economies and international 
trade, extensive artificial controls of foreign exchange 
and international investment markets, a number of ma-
jor nations near bankruptcy and, of course, shattered 
industrial plants over wide areas. 
Free-world planners were convinced it was a prime 
necessity to set up a postwar system of stable inter-
national currencies and an organization within which 
nations could assist one another in maintaining that 
stability. This was seen as essential for the revival of 
international trade, without which the prospects for eco-
nomic recovery and world-wide prosperity after the war 
would be dim indeed. For this purpose the IMF was 
created through the Bretton Woods international con-
ference in 1944 and began operations officially in 
March 1947. There are now 120 member nations. This 
compares with 131 members in the United Nations cur-
rently. Yugoslavia is the only Eastern European com-
munist country with IMF membership. 
As indicated in the IMF Articles of Agreement, the 
essence of the Fund's purpose is to facilitate expansion 
and balanced growth of international trade as a vital 
element in promotion of a high level of employment and 
real income in all member nations and to this end facili-
tate the development of their productive resources. The 
major premises incorporated into the Fund's organi-
zation and operating philosophy as essential to achieve 
this purpose are: 
1. A system of fixed exchange rates under an inter-
national gold-exchange standard, for avoidance of 
the competitive-exchange depreciation that could 
lead to monetary chaos. 
2. A substantial fund of gold and other monetary re-
serves, contributed by the members and used for 
mutual assistance in helping correct temporary 
maladjustments in their international-payment bal-
ances, in order to shorten the duration and lessen 
the degree of imbalances. 
3. Free foreign-exchange markets, without govern-
ment restrictions that would hamper the growth of 
world trade. 
4. A multilateral system of international payments. 
5. Machinery for international monetary consultation 
and cooperation. 
The Gold Exchange Standard. The IMF was founded to 
support and strengthen the workings of the international 
gold exchange standard, which has evolved from the 
traditional gold standard during the twentieth century. 
The international gold standard is based on the premise 
that gold is the ultimate value for settling international 
balances and, in fact, is the only final instrument for 
measuring and protecting the value of money on which 
human beings, regardless of nationality, can depend 
indefinitely and unconditionally against all uncertainties. 
Under this premise, gold is the only basis for money 
value that can be counted on always to be completely 
acceptable, anywhere in the world. It is the only safe-
guard against the fact that public powers cannot be 
depended upon to live up to their obligations or prom-
ises to maintain the value of money. History contains 
many examples that demonstrate this proposition. 
Under a gold-exchange standard, a country estab-
lishes its monetary unit to represent a specified weight 
of gold and undertakes to redeem its paper money on 
demand, either in gold or in a "reserve currency," which 
is itself redeemable in gold and is expected to be always 
universally accepted as being "as good as gold." The 
U.S. dollar has been the generally used reserve cur-
rency. 
A key point is that the gold-exchange standard im-
poses a strict discipline on a national administration. 
It must not create so much money, relative to the 
strength of its monetary reserves, that domestically it 
loses the confidence of its citizens against inflation, 
which causes them to demand and hoard gold or its 
equivalent. Internationally, the country must succeed 
in balancing its payments. Otherwise, gold or the re-
serve currency will be demanded in settlement of 
foreign claims, although temporarily, borrowing from 
outside sources may tide the administration over a short-
term problem situation. 
Monetary or fiscal mismanagement which results in 
inflation of the money supply will generate a drain of 
monetary reserves, domestically or internationally or 
both. This will force a shrinkage in quantity of money 
and a deflation of prices, wages and other costs, in order 
to correct the situation which caused the inflation in the 
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first place. It is a hard discipline, usually accompanied 
by increased unemployment and other problems, but if 
defending the value of its money is a nation's primary 
goal, the gold-exchange standard will do the job. 
It is a truism that, under the automatic workings of 
the gold-exchange standard, the surest way for a nation 
to get itself into monetary difficulties is to persist in 
running government expenditures well beyond the limit 
of its will or its capacity to levy taxes, creating deficits 
that are covered by inflating the money supply; also, 
over an extended period to buy or spend more abroad 
than it sells or otherwise has the resources for payment. 
Many devices have been developed to postpone the 
working of this disciplinary force, but a moment of truth 
has to be faced eventually. 
At that point, the nation may default and reduce the 
value of its monetary unit in an attempt to avoid the 
sacrifices involved in maintaining its commitment. Since 
there is no fully effective sanction against such a default, 
experience has shown this to be perhaps the greatest 
weakness of the system. However, if a permanent de-
cline takes place in the economic position of a nation 
notwithstanding its best efforts, devaluation would be 
logical and unavoidable in recognition of the decline. 
A devaluation in such circumstances would not be 
inconsistent with the philosophy of the gold-exchange 
standard. Naturally, in case of devaluation of the reserve 
currency, the effects could be especially serious and 
would be shared by all nations to the extent they were 
holding the reserve currency as part of their monetary 
reserves. 
Monetary Commitments of IMF Members. Members com-
mitted themselves to the international gold-exchange 
standard by fixing their monetary units at specified 
weights in gold or in relation to the U.S. dollar with its 
gold content of .888671 gram as of July 1, 1944—equiv-
alent to a gold price of US$35 per ounce. They agreed 
to maintain that parity in the foreign-exchange markets. 
This commitment does not necessarily include adher-
ence to the gold-exchange standard domestically. The 
United States does not redeem its money for its citizens 
in gold and they are not free to buy and hold gold. 
Members agreed to limit exchange fluctuations to no 
more than one percent up or down from official par. 
They also agreed to refrain from changing official parity 
unless forced to do so to correct a fundamental dis-
equilibrium in the balance of payments. Thus the com-
mitment to maintain parity is not absolute. But it does 
apply to situations that can be met by responsible mon-
etary and fiscal management and genuine effort by the 
member, supported by the assistance it can obtain from 
other members and the IMF. 
When forced to change its official parity by develop-
ment of a fundamental disequilibrium, a member may 
make any change up to ten percent without prior con-
sultation with the IMF. The Articles of Agreement provide 
that the IMF will not raise any objection to a change 
within that range. Larger changes are not to be made 
without prior consultation with the IMF and the IMF will 
concur if it agrees that the change is needed to correct 
a fundamental disequilibrium. In that case, the resources 
of the IMF are used to assist the member to make a 
smooth transition. However, if a member changes its par-
ity over the objections of the IMF, the support of the 
Fund's resources may not be made available and com-
pulsory withdrawal by the member may result. 
Member countries also pledged themselves to the 
ideal of free foreign exchange markets as quickly as 
their postwar economic conditions would permit. During 
the postwar period exchange controls were removed 
gradually, although in the developing countries this ideal 
is still some distance from full realization. The IMF pub-
lishes annual reports on exchange restrictions, use of 
multiple exchange rates and other control devices still 
in effect. It should be noted that under the IMF Articles 
of Agreement, an exception is made to this pledge and 
members may exercise exchange controls where ex-
change problems are due to capital movements. 
The philosophy of the IMF is that fixed, free market 
exchange rates, with the minimum of government con-
trols or other interference with the exchange markets 
will minimize exchange uncertainties which hamper 
trade and will encourage international trade, travel and 
investment to flourish—and they have. 
The IMF system is designed to provide flexibility and 
aids to liquidity which will enable members to cope with 
reasonable payment imbalances without threatening 
their ofiicial parity. It also recognizes that exchange 
rates must be realistic and that fundamental economic 
developments may render changes necessary. The rates 
set originally in 1946 proved to be too high in some cases 
and revisions were made. In situations where funda-
mental adjustments later became necessary, the re-
sources of the IMF have been a powerful support to 
members. 
This outline indicates the extent to which IMF members 
have voluntarily surrendered a significant part of their 
sovereign freedom to manipulate the international value 
of their currencies and have pledged to observe a code 
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of behavior for common benefit, based on free foreign-
exchange markets and fixed rates of exchange. 
IMF Organization and Resources. The IMF is directed 
by a Board of Governors and a group of Executive Direc-
tors. These are chosen and exercise their powers on 
behalf of the member countries under a rather complex 
voting system which, in effect, gives weight to the votes 
of members in relation to their contributions to the re-
sources of the IMF. These contributions are made in 
accordance with assigned quotas, which are based on 
the amount of each member's national income and its 
share of world trade. 
Quotas are reviewed and adjusted at intervals not 
exceeding five years. The latest review was in 1969 and 
the total of all quotas was increased to US$28.5 billion 
from the previous total of US$21.3 billion. There are 
seven members with quotas of US$1 billion or more: 
U.S.A. 
United Kingdom 
Germany 
France 
Japan 
Canada 
Italy 
$6.7 
2.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1.1 
1.0 
These seven provide 55 percent of the total. Other 
quotas range downward to US$5 million. 
A quota may also be adjusted at any time on request 
of the member and concurrence by a prescribed majority 
of the membership, as provided in the Articles of Agree-
ment. Consent of the member country is required before 
any change in its quota can become effective. 
Each member contributes 25 percent of its quota in 
gold and 75 percent in its own currency. In a very real 
sense, these funds are a central international reserve 
behind the currency values of the members. When it 
needs other currencies for settling payment balances, 
a member may borrow them from the Fund in exchange 
for its own, for periods of from three to five years. This 
period is designed to give the member time to solve 
temporary problems. The time limit emphasizes that it 
is not intended to maintain an unrealistic exchange rate 
indefinitely. 
Lending by the IMF is automatic up to the amount of 
a member's gold contribution (25 percent of quota). 
Loans beyond that amount are available and may ex-
ceed the member's total quota by special arrangement. 
The IMF derives revenues from charges on its loans. If 
the amount of a member's currency held by the Fund 
as a result of borrowing remains in excess of its quota 
for a period of more than three months, a special charge 
is levied. All loan charges are payable in gold. Since gold 
cannot earn income while held in its vaults, the IMF 
transferred some of its gold holdings to the U.S. Treasury 
with right of repurchase, in exchange for interest-bearing 
Treasury obligations, thereby supplementing its income. 
The total of these transfers was US$800 million, reduced 
to US$400 million by repurchase during 1970. 
Special Drawing Rights. With the substantial growth of 
world trade during the past two decades, some concern 
arose in international monetary circles as to whether 
total world monetary reserves, including the resources 
and lending capacity of the IMF, might prove inadequate 
for all members to maintain enough liquidity for con-
tinued growth. To guard against the danger of problems 
arising from inadequate reserves, the IMF put into effect 
on January 1, 1970, a system of Special Drawing Rights 
(SDRs). The total number SDRs created now stands at 
9.3 billion. These have been allotted to members pro rata 
in accordance with their individual quota contributions 
to the IMF. 
The SDRs are defined as having the same value as 
an equal number of U.S. dollars in gold. Members have 
agreed to accept them in settlement of international bal-
ances, with the limitation that no member is required to 
accept SDRs beyond a total amount equal to three times 
its IMF quota contribution. Interest is earned by mem-
bers on SDRs received in settlements and held. At pres-
ent, members are expected to leave on deposit with the 
IMF an average of 30 percent of the SDRs allotted to 
them—an international compensating balance. If at any 
time a member's drawings of SDRs exceed 70 percent 
of its allotment, such excess must be redeposited and 
the 30 percent average restored. Because of the mem-
bers' commitment to accept them in settlement of 
claims, SDRs are a new addition to each member's 
international monetary reserves. 
Creation of reserve assets is an important extension 
of the international monetary system and is only pos-
sible because of the cooperative participation of trading 
nations through the IMF. The universal acceptance of 
SDRs means that they supplement a member's gold 
and dollar exchange holdings as reserves supporting 
the official parity of its currency. In its 1971 Annual Re-
port, the IMF announced that the SDRs have now be-
come established as usable and acceptable reserve 
assets; that participants have been willing to acquire 
and hold them and have been able to use them readily 
to obtain needed foreign exchange. 
Parity Problems. Throughout the years of its operations, 
the IMF has assisted with loans of foreign currencies 
when a member country found itself with a problem in 
maintaining the official parity of its currency. In some 
cases, devaluation nevertheless became necessary and 
smoother transition to a lower parity was facilitated by 
IMF assistance. Naturally, this assistance has been more 
vital to countries with the greatest problems of adverse 
payments balances. However, countries whose balances 
have been consistently favorable and currencies strong 
have also benefited indirectly from the general stability 
of exchange rates, under which their foreign trade has 
prospered. 
During 1971 some serious international payment im-
balances, accompanied by volatile international move-
ments of short-term investment capital, resulted in 
difficulties in maintaining stability in the foreign-
exchange markets. In May, Austria and Switzerland 
revalued their currencies upward by 5 percent and 
7 percent respectively; also, Germany and The Nether-
lands decided to no longer maintain their currencies 
within one percent of official parity and to allow the 
values to float upward. This followed the path taken by 
Canada a year earlier. Subsequently, in August Japan 
also allowed its currency to float upward from official 
parity. 
At the end of 1971, appreciation in currency values 
stood at 15.2 percent for Japan, 12.1 percent for Ger-
many, 11.4 percent for The Netherlands and 8.0 percent 
for Canada. The IMF maintained consultations with these 
members in the expectation that they would resume 
maintenance of the one percent limits around new of-
ficial par values as soon as permitted by circumstances. 
Gold Convertibility. In recent years there have been 
some important developments in the area of gold con-
vertibility. In March 1968 a departure from the discipline 
of the international gold-exchange standard occurred 
when the central banks of five major IMF member 
countries (U.S.A., U.K., Netherlands, Germany, Italy) 
jointly agreed to discontinue supplying gold to the pub-
lic gold markets, although they continued to buy and sell 
gold to central banks at the official parity of US$35 per 
ounce. This reflected a situation where the public mar-
kets apparently had become convinced that the gold 
value of the U.S. dollar could not be maintained indefi-
nitely at that level. 
This was an important limitation on the convertibility 
of currencies into gold, especially serious because it 
related to the reserve currency—the U.S. dollar. Sub-
sequently, in August 1971 the U.S. withdrew completely 
its commitment to redeem U.S. dollars in gold. From 
that time the system has no longer been in fact a gold-
exchange standard. 
New Developments. As a result of negotiations initiated 
late in 1971, some important monetary changes have 
been decided upon by the major IMF member countries. 
These include: 
1. Devaluation of the U.S. dollar by an increase in 
gold price to $38 per ounce, but without resump-
tion of dollar convertibility into gold. 
2. Prompt adoption of new higher official par values 
for most other major currencies. 
3. Continued floating of the Canadian dollar until 
some future date when circumstances permit fixing 
a new official par value. 
4. Widening of the range within which exchange 
rates may fluctuate to not more than 2.25 percent 
up or down from official par, instead of the previous 
limit of one percent up or down. 
The Outlook. The resources of the IMF and its capacity 
for international monetary action have been a very real 
source of financial strength in modern management of 
international monetary affairs. The ability to create new 
resources under the SDRs program adds significantly 
to the Fund's potential for contribution to continued 
expansion of world trade. 
The recent developments which are challenges to 
the basic premises of the IMF and the international mon-
etary program for which it stands may be highlighted 
as follows: 
1. Relaxing the commitment of major trading nations 
to maintain fixed exchange rates and limit fluctu-
ations to a range of one percent up or down. The 
discipline of the policy of fixed exchange rates is 
onerous but it imparts a valuable stability to ex-
change dealings. With the broadening of the range 
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of fluctuations to 2.25 percent up or down, the 
question is whether the system can be managed 
in a manner that will avoid uncertainties which 
would hinder continued growth of world trade. 
2. Abandonment of gold convertibility of the reserve 
currency. This removes another discipline which 
is basic to the IMF program for maintaining stability 
of exchange values. The question is whether the 
world any longer needs gold as a basis for the 
international monetary system. 
3. Freedom of foreign-exchange markets from gov-
ernmental restrictions which could hamper the 
continued expansion of world trade. The question 
is whether movement away from the two preceding 
basic premises will result in creation of insur-
mountable obstacles to the maintenance of this 
third essential. 
The real meaning of these questions is whether the 
fundamentals of the system designed nearly 30 years 
ago at Bretton Woods are still essential for the continued 
growth of world trade, as a vital element toward the 
high purpose for which the experiment in international 
monetary cooperation was launched in 1944. Or, has 
the world finally reached the point where disciplines 
developed through the lessons of experience in an 
earlier monetary era are no longer applicable? This 
is what is being decided by world monetary leadership 
in the current developments, with important future con-
sequences for everyone involved in international busi-
ness. 
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